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Why Bad Books Matter: Past and Future Directions for
Understanding Reactionary Ideology
Richard Shorten
Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
A useful tool for learning more about the ways in which the hard
Right communicates and integrates is the reactionary diatribe. This
is signiﬁcant in a political context where the hard Right not only is
experiencing success, but the default categories of interpretation
and criticism can lack bite. A fresh direction for research would
link present politics back to historical practice but channel
contemporary methods for rhetorical study, picking out
reactionary writings as a stable object for inquiry. Therefore, this
article (1) revives the category of reaction by re-picturing it as a
‘second-order’ ideology encompassing all those right-wingers
professing to stand on the ‘wrong side of History’; (2) draws
lessons from some defects of ‘populism’ theories; (3) places a
methodological proposal in relation to earlier theories of reaction,
which are confounded most of all by reactionary contradictoriness
– a feature that rhetorical analysis is far better able to
accommodate, inasmuch as messy, chaotic, sometimes ugly
communication is grist to its mill. Lastly, (4) the diatribe model
itself is described (key properties being digression, repetition and
point-dwelling), and then laid out as groundwork for further, in-
depth inquiry. In the meantime, an important truth surfaces: bad
books matter.
Introduction
Trump’s America, Brexit Britain, and the rise of radical anti-immigration parties in main-
land Europe should call political scientists to want to (re)engage seriously and closely with
theories of the political Right. Within a general literature on politics, theories of reaction
are few and far between.1 Even fewer such theories are addressed speciﬁcally to the recent
occurrences.2 Yet, if reformulated according to an adequate framework, I argue that a
theory of political reaction may hold signiﬁcant interpretive, and also critical, force. For
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Richard Shorten r.c.shorten@bham.ac.uk Department of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
1For the exceptions, see esp. Albert O Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991); Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to
Sarah Palin (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011); Peter King, Reaction: Against the Modern World (Exeter: Imprint
Academic, 2012); Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction (New York, NY: New York Review of Books, 2016).
2Heinrich Geiselberger (ed) The Great Regression (London: Polity, 2017); Andrew Sullivan, ‘The Reactionary Temptation’,
New York Magazine, 30 April 2017.
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scholars and publics alike, therefore, reaction may merit greater attention than it is cur-
rently allotted.
In this article, I attempt to show four things. First, after setting aside some basic deﬁni-
tional qualms about reaction, I make a case for recognizing reaction as an ideology. Second, I
try to establish the value which reaction may have against other theories of the Right – par-
ticularly, as against ‘populism’. Third, I reﬂect upon why it is that the extant theories of reac-
tion itself largely fail, proposing that they take ineﬀectual units of analysis. Fourth, in place
the extant theories, I suggest how the use of rhetoric may prove enlightening, stating a
rationale for looking closely at reactionary political writings and for undertaking qualitative
text analysis on a particular format: the model of the reactionary diatribe. Participation in
the diatribe format is the explanation for why reactionaries write bad books. Potentially,
exposing the recurrence of the format will generate many more interpretive and critical
insights. Therefore, I submit, bad books should matter.
The spirit of the article is exploratory. By the end, the aim is to have justiﬁed a method for
a future research direction, and not yet to have achieved a fully-ﬂedged theory.3 The sugges-
tion is that what would be beneﬁcial to the understanding of political reactionaries is a more
substantial piece of research applying that method to a broad range of historical and con-
temporary cases. An addendum to the ﬁnal part of the article does brieﬂy sketch four
case studies, albeit for limited ends: to illustrate; to vindicate the criticisms made of popu-
lism. Nevertheless, even rapid treatment of these cases suggests one ﬁnding, which concerns
the dividing line that may only weakly separate reactionaries from conservatives. That this
line appears blurry – and intrinsically so – is signiﬁcant in view of disagreement between
extant commentators about whether the division is fairly ﬁxed (Mark Lilla) or actually
absent (Corey Robin).4 The diatribe is a clumsy model of expression and, commensurately,
the early empirical evidence is that right-wing texts frequently slip-up: emitting a reactionary
message sometimes, but also switching repeatedly into relative moderation.
From misconceived deﬁnitions to second-order ideology
Reaction is an intuitive term. Indeed, that is one of the key motivations for turning to it.
However, coming to be looked upon more carefully, political reaction is far from easy to
deﬁne.5 Misconceptions abound, obscuring its potential usage from the oﬀ. Most destruc-
tive, perhaps, are two of the regular misconceptions: ﬁrst, that reaction is simply a ‘binary’
term (and a binary term alone); second, that it is a ‘relational’ term.
As a binary, ‘progress’ is reaction’s fairly standard polar opposite.6 Alternatively, ‘revo-
lution’ can comprise the opposite, although the revolutionary/ reactionary pairing is not
particularly du jour. Regarding the reaction/ progress pairing, studies in etymology are
informative about its enduring nature, roughly since the eighteenth century.7 At a
3This article is part of a larger project on political reactionaries funded by a Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship. The
arguments arising are set out in monograph form in The Ideology of Political Reactionaries (Manchester University
Press, forthcoming). For an initial consideration of the issues, see Richard Shorten, ‘Reactionary Rhetoric Reconsidered’,
Journal of Political Ideologies, 20:2 (2015), pp. 179–200.
4Mark Lilla, ‘Republicans for Revolution’, New York Review of Books, 59:1 (2012), p. 14; Robin, op. cit.
5Philology is an emphasis in James Alexander, ‘Reaction in Politics’, Journal of the Philosophy of History (forthcoming).
6E.g. Lisa Nandy, ‘Caroline Lucas and Chris Bowers’ in The Alternative: Towards a New Progressive Politics (London: Biteback,
2015).
7Jean Starobinski, Action and Reaction: The Life and Adventures of a Couple, transl. Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books,
2003).
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workaday level, however, the inference derived from such is crude. ‘Reaction’ is reinforced
as just a category of default: one who is a political reactionary is one who isn’t a ‘progress-
ive’. The consequence is that in sharp contrast to progressivism,8 reaction forfeits inves-
tigation in its own right. And hence, relative neglect of the category has followed.
The relational understanding is already a feature of the ﬁrst misconception. But it has a
speciﬁc deﬁciency, which goes one stage deeper. When reaction is a binary, it at least gets
some content of its own (even if that content is inscribed as an afterthought). But when
reaction is relational, nothing is there to be recognized as identifying content at all. What-
ever may give the illusion of such is merely a mark of speciﬁc distance from another cat-
egory. Consider, for example, the allegation that there can be ‘reactionaries of the Left’.
That is interesting not only because it is false (which I am inclined to think it is), but
because it shows how the contest not only between political opponents, but also notional
allies, can detract from constructive usage: centrists often use reaction to identify hard Left
opponents of ‘modernization’ (think use by ‘Blairites’ in the U.K., or ‘Clintonites’ in the
U.S.); in turn, so-called hard Leftists condemn putative reactionary factions who obstruct
‘true’ goals (think use by ‘Corbynites’ in the U.K., or ‘Bernie-ites’ in the U.S.). In either
instance, however, ‘reaction’ moves as the protagonists move. And so, perhaps worse
than neglect, reaction is reduced to the acrobatics of political positioning.
Reaction, then, intuitively appears an important category, but is fuzzy. When nothing is
done to obtain clarity, there is a disservice to interpretation and criticism alike. Of course,
there is an obvious option – ditch the category entirely – but this article endorses a bolder
tack. The starting point is to call for recognition of reaction not only from the analytical
viewpoint of ideology study but as an ‘ideology’. In short, the dominant classiﬁcatory
schemes of ideologies should be opened up so that reaction gets included amongst
them. Endorsing this tack may seem like introducing one more deﬁnitional conceit
having just poured cold water several others. So it is appropriate to ﬂag up the empirical
points of departure that preclude the manoeuvre from being arbitrary. One important cue
to recognizing reaction as an ideology, I assert, is a basic, observable reality: reactionaries
articulate variations upon a single stated thought. Wild as it may initially seem – for the
idiomatic phrase is generally derogatory –9 reactionaries habitually profess that they stand
on ‘the wrong side of History’. Hence, standing on History’s wrong side is an inductive
starting-point for a research direction that alternately builds-in elements both of deduc-
tion and induction; that is, hopefully, viewing ‘real-world’ phenomena through a meta-
phorical lens, but not to the extent of forcing it into a mould. The variations on the
stated thought are abundant (especially if one considers that History has ﬂuctuating cog-
nates from ‘Destiny’ to ‘true north’): Éric Zemmour: ‘History is always our code, but it is
an altered, falsiﬁed, denatured History’.10 Donald Trump: ‘This American carnage stops
right here and stops right now’.11 Sarah Palin: ‘as a country, our true north is the
values and principles on which we were founded – those values that are under attack
8E.g. Emily Robinson et al., ‘Symposium on Progressive Politics’, Political Studies Review, 12:1 (2014), pp. 2–74.
9Karl Marx famously ridiculed reactionaries ‘for they try to roll back the wheel of history’. More recently, former US president
Barack Obama – on the day after the presidential election of 2016 – oﬀered a more consensual twist on the notion: ‘You
know, the path this country has taken has never been a straight line. We zig and zag and sometimes we move in ways
that some people think is forwards and others think is moving back’. ‘Statement by the President’, National Archives and
Records Administration, 9 November 2016, http://bit.ly/2A28UVs.
10Éric Zemmour, Le Suicide Français (Paris: Albin Michel, 2014), p. 10.
11‘Donald Trump’s dark vision is the problem, not the solution’, The Guardian, Saturday 23 July 2016, p. 38.
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today’.12 Adolf Hitler: ‘When over long periods of human history I scrutinized the activity
of the Jewish people, suddenly there rose in me the fearful question whether inscrutable
Destiny […] did not desire the ﬁnal victory of this little nation’.13
A caveat is that reaction may not qualify as a ‘ﬁrst-order’ ideology (like liberalism,
socialism, or conservatism),14 yet could have claims at a second-order level. The notion
of a ‘second-order’ ideology, moreover, would align with the growing compunction
among scholars to treat the ideological ﬁeld as multi-layered.15 Can instances of ideo-
logical articulation belong to more than one category at the same time? Could ideologi-
cal aﬃliations overlap and intertwine, rather than entail exclusivity? Some categories at
the second-order level (and beyond) become especially intriguing: nothing precludes,
say, articulations of ‘Euroscepticism’, ‘alt-Right-ism’, ‘monarchism’ or ‘fascism’ from
simultaneous aﬃliation to reaction-ism – and, with an eye to political criticism, layer-
ing is especially auspicious, because chances of coming to appreciate novel connections
expand. Take the current discourse of public intellectuals concerning the contemporary
Right: arguably, this discourse is hardening into an unproductive dichotomy, whereby
on the one hand are those largely abrogating the duty of meaningful historical com-
parison16 and, on the other, those reaching for the strongest categories too quickly.17
Nonchalance (or worse) thereby meets well-intentioned hyperbole, but the most attrac-
tive option might actually sit-in-between: to decamp to the bigger picture, so that per-
spectives may truly broaden, not narrow, and whereby appropriate parallels and
precedents can be calibrated without being either irresponsibly deﬂated or prematurely
aﬃrmed.
We should not lost sight of the analytical preconditions. Before reaction can help serve
either interpretive or critical functions, basic criteria for identifying ideologies will need to
be met. Logically, the criteria for admission at second order do not diﬀer from ﬁrst order.
As such, consider there must be (i) a pattern of interlinked features (internal criterion) and
(ii) enclosure within reasonably speciﬁable boundaries (external criterion).18 These criteria
provide structure to our search for a groundwork upwards from which to construct the
fully-ﬂedged ideological theory.
From ‘populism’ to reaction
So far reaction has been redescribed as a candidate ideology of the second order. With this,
reaction enters into a new terrain: no longer is it merely a knockabout political boo-word,
12Sarah Palin, America by Heart: Reﬂections on Family, Faith and Flag (New York: Broadside Books, 2013), p. xvii.
13Hitler, Mein Kampf, transl. Ralph Mannheim (London: Pimlico, 1992), p. 60.
14James Alexander, ‘The Major Ideologies of Liberalism, Socialism and Conservatism’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 63:5
(2015), pp. 980–994.
15Michael Freeden (ed) Re-energising Ideology Studies: The Maturing of a Discipline (London: Routledge, 2018).
16Inter alia see Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy (London:
Penguin, 2018); David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (London:
C. Hurst & Co, 2017); Eric Kaufman, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (London: Allen
Lane, 2018).
17Inter alia, see Sarah Churchwell, Behold, America: A History of America First and the America Dream (London: Bloomsbury,
2018); Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (London: Bodley Head, 2017), p. 13; and
Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Europe, Russia, America (London: Bodley Head, 2018).
18See Jonathan Leader Maynard, ‘Ideological Analysis’ in Adrian Blau (ed) Methods in Analytical Political Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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and neither is it a term of anachronism, reserved for purely historical study.19 Reaction
now competes with a range of other categories for reckoning with contemporary develop-
ments on the hard Right. Of these, there is a foremost rival: ‘populism’.
‘Populism’ has a widespread public uptake. On the evidence of scholarly publications,
populism also has the investment of perhaps the majority of academic commentators, with
the dissenting voices to ‘today’s inﬂated currency of the term’ being a distinct minority.20
But is the exposure deserved? Does populism serve us well? To be sure, ‘reaction’ and
‘populism’ are not labels-cum-theories which are in direct competition. The projected
real-world scopes of applications of each may coincide, yet they diﬀer (by no means are
all reactionaries popular, nor would they wish to be). Furthermore, it is a corollary of
the state-of-play of ideology studies sketched above that in order to do justice to a varie-
gated and complex ﬁeld, we might well need categories that are several. But while inter-
pretive pluralism may be commendable in general, what I call for is, indeed, to re-
invest in reaction quite consciously at populism’s expense, on the grounds that the
semi-perfunctory, largely unreﬂective turn to populism is what frequently keeps the
novel appreciation of connections at bay. Below, for three of the most common
approaches to populism,21 I state one key respect in which we have failed; which is not
meant as an exercise in academic one-upmanship, rather to pinpoint that from which a
theory of reaction might learn. So as not to miss these lessons, they are stated by way
of maxims.
. Populism as the resort to new, highly-direct forms of communication, organisation and/
or mobilisation.22 This approach oﬀers an unsatisfying lens on the contemporary hard
Right for centring ideological innovation when more apt is something like ideological
re-articulation. Colloquially, we ‘do’ politics diﬀerently now, which we need to ‘get
over’, so as to ask more sophisticated questions about the adaptation which changes
in an external technological environment require. So, ‘avoid overstating newness’.
. Populism as a ‘thin-centred’ ideological construct.23 This approach is welcome for repu-
diating that contemporary ideological developments are created ex nihilo, instead pro-
posing historical contextualization for a type of politics which it deems to be conﬁgured
around a single idea (‘the people’), and expressed stereotypically in the platforms of
‘people’s parties’. Yet the thin-centre provides for a history which is notably bitty
and contained within periodic ‘eruptions’24 – as though most of the time, ‘populists’
19E.g. John S McLelland, ‘The Reactionary Right: The French Revolution, Charles Maurras and the Action Française’ in Roger
Eatwell and Noel Sullivan (eds) The Nature of the Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789
(London: Pinter, 1989).
20Marco D’Eramo, ‘They, The People’, New Left Review, 103 (2017), p. 131.
21Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, ‘Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda’ in Weatherhead
Working Paper Series, 2013, No. 13-0004.
22Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave, ‘Populism as a Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties’
Discourse in Belgium’, European Journal of Political Science, 46:3 (2007), pp. 319–345; Robert R Barr, ‘Populists, Outsiders
and Anti-Establishment Politics’, Party Politics, 15:1 (2009), pp. 29–48; Robert S Jansen, ‘Populist Mobilization: A New
Theoretical Approach to Politics’, Sociological Theory, 29:2 (2011), pp. 75–96.
23Cass Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Margaret Canovan,
‘Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy’ in Yves Meny and Yves Surel (eds) Democracies and
the Populist Challenge (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Ben Stanley, ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism’, Journal of Political Ideol-
ogies, 13:1 (2008), pp. 95–110; Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism? (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2016). Strictly-speaking, Müller does not foreground a conceptual core, rather an elemental ‘logic’.
24John B Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics (Columbia
Global Reports, 2016).
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were reassuringly sated.25 In principle bittiness could be true of the historical record,
but is perhaps also the false impression derived from looking little further than
actors and movements calling themselves ‘populist’, which for the theory of any ideol-
ogy is an imperfect principle for selecting source material, inasmuch as being both
incomplete and unreliable. Hence, ‘avoid getting hung-up on self-description’.
. Populism as a marker of discourse, especially discursive (or sometimes performative)
‘style’.26 The discourse approach, encouragingly, usually takes up the long view
without rendering populism counterfactually subterranean. Shorn of the extravagances
of discourse theory (which may make it persuasive to a broader audience), it boils down
to the notion that we know we are in populism’s presence if we can observe an ‘us’
versus ‘them’ logic to public-political argument.27 However, quite aside from perhaps
now making the category a little too inclusive, the emphatic nature of the us-versus-
them logic seems to ﬂy in the face of some of the prosaic realities with which people
take up political positions: namely, that people ﬂirt with positions, or ﬂit to and fro.
The ups-and-downs of political support metrics, for example, suggest that hard-Right-
ists are not dyed-in-the-wool. Lastly, then, ‘avoid reifying ideological subjects’. For as
human beings, they may be mercurial.
These maxims from the interpretive deﬁciencies of populism bear drawing out expli-
citly. Avoid overstating newness? Being able to lay claim to long-term indicators is one
of reaction’s strengths. Avoid getting hung-up on self-descriptions? We are scarcely
likely to do so, since if only ‘out’ reactionaries were to count there would be precious
little to go upon in the ﬁrst place (the self-description is generally toxic). But note there
is an important distinction between what in my own scheme amounts to privileging reac-
tionary self-understanding (the wrong side of History) and reactionary self-labelling. Avoid
reifying the human subjects of ideology? This is special reason to be sensitive towards reac-
tion’s external boundaries. For, whilst they must be reasonably speciﬁable, boundaries that
may be porous do not negate the existence of an autonomous category per se.
So opportunities for reviving reaction seem ample in view of the problems experienced
by other theories. Do not forget there is also the simple sense in which doing so ought to be
advantageous, with reference to the stalemate between public intellectuals. Even if reac-
tion’s claims to validity ahead of populism were hollow, the very act of shifting focus
ought to shake up the standard reference points, making space for unfamiliar thoughts,
perceptions and images: empirically, a theory of political reaction will bring together a col-
lection of instances of right-wing politics diﬀerent to those subsumable under populism.
But, to the extent they are expounded, what next of the documented theories of reaction?
If populism is to be junked, what is it that requires us to re-formulate reaction, before we
can boost its credentials for recognition as an ideology? There is a common reason to set
documented theories aside: ineﬀectual units of analysis.
25The priority of the concept ‘the people’ is also distinct from the concept’s complexion. Even if the former is historically
continuous, the latter might vary.
26Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005); Francisco Panizza (ed) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy
(London: Verso, 2005); Benjamin Moﬃtt and Simon Tormey. ‘Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political
Style’, Political Studies, 62:2 (2014), pp. 381–397; Benjamin Moﬃtt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political
Style and Representation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).
27Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998); Paris Aslandis, ‘Is
Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective’, Political Studies, 64:1 (2016), pp. 88–104.
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Why extant theories of reaction fail
The extant theories of reaction are a mix of the old and the new, whereby the recent the-
orists of most note are Corey Robin,28 Peter King,29 and Mark Lilla.30 Lilla aside, the short-
comings can be said to derive from operationalizing units of analysis which will not work.
The abortive units for reactionary ideology are, respectively: dispositions; social interests;
and concepts. A ﬁrst position dubiously psycho-pathologizes a political orientation that, if
disquieting, is nonetheless quite regular. A second position is confounded by unexpected
modes of identity politics, for which it tries in vain to locate a materialist basis. A third
position searches for a coherent conceptual vocabulary to reaction which, we should con-
jecture, is never to be found.
Dispositions
To theorize reactionary dispositions is not foolish per se. To the contrary, it would seem
eminently sensible to tune into both the strongly aﬀective and seemingly extraordinary
qualities reactionaries display. Popularly – but not absurdly – reactionaries (whether
they are leaders or followers) are tracked to distinctive personality-types: for instance,
the zealot, the narcissist, the sexual repressive, the sadist, the ‘Colonel Blimp’ (British
expression for patrician curmudgeon), the ‘Pooter’ (ditto for self-important suburban
bourgeois). These have equivalents in a scholarly setting. An old idea here is the ‘author-
itarian personality’.31 Newer impetus comes from work on ideology in political
psychology.32
To cast reactionaries as blend of the mad, bad and stupid is, therefore, a temptation that
comes from several quarters. Yet it contravenes some standard precepts of sound analysis,
which ultimately there are no reasons to forego. First, when dispositions are theorized,
there is a stasis ascribed to reactionaries. The social and intersubjective dimension of
human experience liable to inﬂuence belief-formation is all but bracketed oﬀ. At worst,
that facilitates the misleading conclusion that one does not become a reactionary,
because one is born so. Second, theorizing dispositions is to commit a social-science sin
of supposing ‘deviancy’. That is problematic for a number of reasons which one does
not need to be strong Foucauldian to appreciate, but to turn one eye already towards
rhetoric, it is to err by discounting – in advance – any possibility that reactionaries
might be a product of an internal dialogue.33
Social interests
The social dimension, conversely, is to the fore in the account of reaction proﬀered by
various kinds of Marxist, all of whom feature the particular category of ‘social interest’.
28Robin, op. cit.
29King, Reaction, op. cit.; King, The Antimodern Condition: An Argument Against Progress (London: Routledge, 2014).
30Lilla, Shipwrecked Mind, op. cit.
31Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality
(New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1950).
32Christopher S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto, Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
33Hannah Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’ in Jerome Kohn (ed) Responsibility and Judgment (New York:
Schocken, 2013).
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The political success of reaction here is also normal – hardly uncommon – though because
this scholarship is more extended, it is suitable to catalogue its faults by ‘testing’ it in
hypothetical kinds of scenario: simple, awkward, and hard cases of reaction.
First, the ‘simple’ case is well handled by Corey Robin: social superiors possess one
interest, social ‘subordinates’ another – and the ‘superiors’ win out. The main thrust of
Robin’s thesis presents reaction in these über-materialist terms: ‘since the modern era
began’, he writes, ‘men and women in subordinate positions have marched against their
superiors’, and ‘in virtually every instance, their superiors have resisted them’.34 The
main thrust is only partly restrained by periodic concessions to reaction’s more value-
driven and dynamic aspects (an animating ‘principle’ of natural hierarchy, an interesting
philosophical relationship between ‘loss’ and violence).35 The fault is that occurrences in
the real world frequently elude the simple case.
Second, the ‘awkward’ case acknowledges that followers of reaction can include
notional ‘subordinates’ – who receive no realistic prospect of material gain in exchange
for their allegiance. Think so-called ‘Church and King’ uprisings staged historically by
Western European peasant groups.36 An account like Robin’s tends to call up auxiliary
‘false consciousness’ explanations in this scenario: subordinate groups let go of their
interests because they are permeated by ideology which is dominant.37 To the extent
that false consciousness are widely discredited in contemporary social science,38 the
inadequacy of this propping-up strategy need not be lingered upon. But, potentially,
revisionist perspectives emerging out of post-Marxism oﬀer more robust accommo-
dation. For Ernesto Laclau, precepts of classical Marxism need revising to take
account of identity politics, in eﬀect: the identities of those who compose the subordi-
nate groups are not pre-settled, only in need of activation via correct consciousness-
raising, but are actively up for discursive negotiation, with open-ended possibilities.39
In consequence of this move, there is a degree of purchase obtained on the ‘real-
world’ awkard cases: for instance, not only peasants who turned out for king, but
urban workers were among those who ‘went’ fascist,40 or women who opposed the
suﬀrage.41
Third, however, there is the ‘hard’ case, which not even the most innovative of Marx-
isms will get around. Here, for example, the peasant, worker, or woman supporting reac-
tion will not merely put material well-being on hold, but will ﬂatly and actively defy it –
acting as though it were no consideration at all. This scenario is timely, of course. Why is it
that the non-privileged are not simply among the hard Right’s backers but often the most
conspicuous – given to expressing the most ire in protest and advocacy? Post-Marxism
thinks of political history and present politics in terms of turning-points-that-failed-to-
34Ibid., p. 3; italics added.
35Robin, op. cit., p. 255 fn. 80, 17, 218. A second edition updates the scope of coverage to include the Trump presidency but
leaves the main perspective intact: Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).
36George Rudé, The Crowd in History (London: Serif. 2005).
37Sheri Berman, ‘The Conservative as Elitist’, The New York Times, 7 October 2011.
38Andrew Shorten, Contemporary Political Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 221–225.
39Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: Verso, 2011); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouﬀe, Hege-
mony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2001); Laclau, On Populist Reason
(London: Verso, 2007).
40Richard F. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).
41Julia Bush, Women Against the Vote: Female Anti-Suﬀragism in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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turn (cf. the interwar Western working-class that failed to go communist).42 Reaction is
therefore understood from a dubious presumption, even if only implicit: that politics
has run oﬀ-course.
By approaching reaction as a sort of barometer of the speciﬁc (and presumably lapsed)
state of the class struggle, the analytical imagination, I suggest, is irredeemably blunted.
Even outside of Marxism, it is worth noting, sociological writing struggles with the hard
case. Consider the assorted work on on U.S. blue-collar Republicanism devoted to fathom-
ing ‘what’s the matter with Kansas’, or the ‘strangers’ of the ‘deep South’, or the ‘hillbillies’
of Appalachia. This, by honing in on representative place and person, succeeds in tapping
into reaction as a raw, ‘lived’ experience, yet still manages to muﬄe the voices of white
working-class identity politics, by tracking it to the distortion either of redistributive
instincts or a natural blue-collar work ethic.43 The lesson is the general one to take out
of the failure of the social interest approach: start to take seriously the possibility that
really in play are not distortions, rather genuine convictions.
Concepts
Trying to reconstruct social interests in order to produce a general theory of political reac-
tion is, then, a dead end. What this points to is the need to make far greater use of the
evidence of what people actually think. Concepts are a standard unit by which to
itemize stated beliefs and, in particular, to render such beliefs into a system.
A conceptual approach to ideologies relies on methods imported from political philos-
ophy.44 It supposes that ideological subjects neither mechanically obey interests, nor have
those interests systematically manipulated behind their backs, rather make choices that to
a large extent are knowing: they elect some concepts, not others; they assign them into
orders of priority; they reﬁne them into conceptions; and they aim at rough consistency
between conceptions.45 But are regular, ordered, consistent conceptions detectable in reac-
tion-ism? The answer would seem to be that they are not, and the recent account oﬀered
by British commentator, Peter King, is symptomatic. In extrapolating from paradigmatic
cases, the most that King is able to match together are four ‘senses’ – each, notably, ident-
iﬁable only in negative terms. King writes:
reaction can be simply summarised by a number of basic propositions… First, there is
general sense of disaﬀection… Second, many people feel they are not being listened to…
Third, many feel that their traditions and accepted ways of life are being threatened…
Fourth, what might be seen as the “establishment”… always excludes them… 46
As an identifying core this is slight, as King acknowledges. His response is to sub-divide
reactionaries, in order to try for the more extended conceptual deﬁnition which would be
42Allegedly, the proletariat missed its ‘rendezvous with History’: Laclau, Politics and Ideology, p. 128.
43Thomas Frank,What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York, NY: Picador, 2005);
J.D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis (London: William Collins, 2016), pp. 140–145. Arlie
Russell Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the America Right (London: New Press, 2016),
is a less closed account.
44Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Gerald Gauss,
Political Concepts and Political Theories (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).
45Michael Freeden, ‘The Morphological Study of Ideology’ in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (eds)
The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
46King, Reaction, op. cit, pp. 29–30.
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satisfying – splitting the conceptual commitments of cultural ‘antimodernists’ from the
beliefs of ‘commonsense’ reactionaries.47 But sub-division may be premature, not least
of all because it reneges on the ‘big picture’ promise of a theory of reaction which (as dis-
cussed earlier) would allow us to illuminate contemporary trends by placing them in broad
contexts of reference. Yet, at the same time, it is trying to attain satisfying deﬁnition of
reactionaries only by sub-division which is the next prod to my own approach. Sub-div-
ision brings one of reactionism’s most fundamental apparent realities to heel, when the
task, really, ought to be to accept that reality, but then to explain it: contradiction, includ-
ing self-contradiction.
If, as at last as we begin to with the conceptual approach, we take reactionaries to be
sincere belief-utterers, then sorting them into boxes is, certainly, one option for dealing
with reaction’s apparent contradictoriness: in one box, say, are the reactionaries who by
invoking God, espouse moral absolutism; in one another are those who in celebrating
local custom, espouse moral relativism. But maybe contradiction should not be moved
on from too lightly? Perhaps, in fact, contradictoriness gets to the heart of the conceptual
structures of reactionary political belief? I follow a thread from this intuition in just a
moment. But for now, for illustration’s sake, reﬂect on how reactionaries handle two
exemplar concepts: science and the state. Plenty of right-wingers oscillate between extol-
ling science over eﬀeminate artiness and disparaging science as the fraud licensing objec-
tionable ‘experts’,48 but the same single mind cannot hold the two thoughts
simultaneously: at least, not logically. Likewise, logical contradiction occurs when a reac-
tionary’s appraisals of the role of state starkly disagree, as in these colloquial examples: ‘the
state should look after people who have given service’ versus ‘people should not expect the
state to bail them out of trouble’.
These examples are merely anecdotal. But if one thing normal to reactionaries is that
what they believe, they believe earnestly, yet conﬂictingly, the implication is substantial.
To genuinely get at their ideology, we may need take up not the most obvious units,
but the units of rhetoric. Why? Rhetoric can allow that reactionaries are persuaded –
not duped (and certainly not born so) – but persuaded whereby the premium on sound
reasoning is low, and where an active role is played not just by argument per se, rather
by political emotion and, for example, assessments of character.
Using rhetoric to theorize reaction
To turn to rhetoric in order to understand reaction is to amplify a point of emphasis in
Lilla’s account to date: argumentation, the energising of reaction in the public square.49
It is also to follow in the footsteps of Albert O. Hirschman, although by discarding
certain of Hirschman’s assumptions about the nature of rhetoric.50 The achievement of
the recent ‘rhetoric revival’ in political studies on either side of the Atlantic has been
much greater methodological self-awareness.51 Such a revival has gathered momentum
47See his follow-up study: King, The Antimodern Condition, op. cit.
48Cf. Matthew d’Ancona, Post-Truth: The New War on Truth and How to Fight Back (London: Ebury, 2017).
49Lilla, Shipwrecked Mind, op. cit. One limit of Lilla’s approach is his range of cases: he concentrates solely on the writings of
intellectuals.
50Hirschman, op. cit. Cf. Shorten, op. cit.
51Bryan Garsten, ‘The Rhetoric Revival in Political Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science, 14 (2011), pp. 159–180.
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in several subﬁelds: history of political thought,52 deliberative democracy,53 Arendtian
political theory,54 rational choice analysis,55 policy analysis.56 However, although there
exist important precedents in the practice of ‘rhetorical criticism’ within communication
studies in the United States, seldom have the implications for ideology study been spelled
out.57 Shortly, therefore, I list some basic tenets for rhetorical ideological analysis to follow;
doing so selectively, mainly in the aim of dispelling preconceptions.
Rhetoric, I suggest, can be the solution to discovering reaction’s internal pattern. But it
merits saying that while rhetoric may also tend to the external ideological criterion
(helping sketch a boundary), there is nothing axiomatic in rhetorical method to
command that the boundary will be rigid and impermeable. That is important, since
Mark Lilla implies otherwise. Roughly, Lilla’s assumption seems to be that because conser-
vatism has clear, tangible markers (like tradition, particularism, concreteness, economic
prudence), there is a sharp line with reaction conceivable. Certainly, that position is desir-
able over rendering conservatism and reaction indistinguishable – the position which
Corey Robin is committed to. Yet, put into the earlier terms of this article, Lilla may
not have moved beyond one of the defects of populism: to avoid reifying reactionaries.
That chimes with the ﬁnding beneath which I label as ideological ‘vacillation’: that ideo-
logical subjects, as language-users, show signs of a tendency to step in/out of reaction and
to/from conservatism.
The aim of this ﬁnal section in itself, however, is simply to defend the groundwork for
the more substantial project that may conﬁrm and extend ﬁndings like the one concerning
blurred dividing lines. In it, the general advantages of a rhetorical approach are converted
into a more particular rationale: for reading, sometimes re-reading, bad books. The key
argument is that the rhetoric discloses the basic and regular communicative practice of
reactionaries: namely, participation in the diatribe format. This, therefore, now provides
a second inductive starting-point for closer investigation, when placed next to the prop-
osition that reactionaries show a regular self-understanding (standing on the ‘wrong
side of History’). Notice the implications for empirical study: a model of the diatribe pro-
vides parameters for the appropriate selection of source material.
What a rhetorical theory of ideology is and is not
Rhetoric enriches the study of ideology by aﬀording communication special priority. But a
rhetorical theory of ideology is not several of the things it can be taken to be. Several
sources of the rhetoric revival in political studies take inspiration from Aristotle’s The
52E.g. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1 Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Bryan
Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defence of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009);
Daniel Kapust, Republicanism, Rhetoric and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
53E.g. John Dryzek, ‘Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation’, Political Theory, 38:3 (2010), pp. 309–339.
54E.g. Linda Zerrilli, ‘“We Feel Our Freedom”: Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt’, Political Theory,
33:2 (2005), pp. 158–188.
55E.g. Iain McLean, Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
56Frank Fischer and Gerald J. Miller (eds.), Handbook of Public Policy Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2007), Part V.
57The salient exception is Alan Finlayson, ‘Ideology and Political Rhetoric’ in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and
Marc Stears (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For noteworthy
engagements with ideology from within communication studies, see Raymie E. McKerrow, ‘Critical Rhetoric: Theory
and Praxis’, Communication Monographs, 56:2 (1989), pp. 91–111, and Philip Wander, ‘The Ideological Turn in Modern
Criticism’, Central States Speech Journal, 34:1 (1983), pp. 1–18.
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Art of Rhetoric,58 and to develop tenets for rhetorical ideological analysis I follow their
lead. The eﬀect is to disavow the following:
. Rhetoric is not (or not only) tactical. As Aristotle opined, rhetoric’s purpose is not the
production of persuasion from without, rather the ‘detection of the persuasive aspects’
latent within.59 To build a rhetorical theory so that ideologists speak nothing but their
convictions would tie one hand behind its back. Yet ceteris paribus, communicators
should be presumed to be sincere.60
. Rhetoric is not ‘aﬀect-displacement’. Communication is on-going, deliberative and inter-
active, meaning that an audience’s ‘emotional state’ is itself open to inﬂuence, as
opposed to being pre-set;61 and entailing that reactionaries may do more interesting
things with speech than simply re-channel ‘democratic anger’.62
. Rhetoric is not supplementary. It is actual ideological substance, and not the outﬁts
which the subject of ideology dresses her belief is up, at the point of deciding he
wants to convince others. Most important of all, then, rhetoric can include talking
oneself into belief.63
What is borrowed from Aristotle in the more positive sense concerns his explication of
rhetorical ‘composition’.64 Aristotle asks, how should a speech be arranged? Within the
ambit of his answer to this question, I ﬁnd the provocation to locate the characteristic reac-
tionary communication medium of the diatribe. Once formalized, we have a de facto tem-
plate for exploring reactionary texts – ideally, bringing out into the open as-yet-unknown
particular features of the ideology, as well as pointers for their potential interlinkage. Some
illustrators of (re)reading texts on the template of the diatribe are sketched in a short while.
Diatribe
Trump’s nothing like Hitler… There’s no way he could write a book.
Scottish comedian, Frankie Boyle65
As with much of what makes the category of reaction appealing, one can reach for ‘dia-
tribe’ intuitively. Diatribe belongs to a loose cluster of genres keyed in a vague sort of
way to feelings like bitterness, regret, grief and nostalgia, and which includes the ‘jeremiad’
and the ‘elegy’.66 Ordinarily, diatribes are rants: they have the qualities of being forceful,
58Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, transl. H.C. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 2004). See, for example, Bernard Yack, ‘Rheto-
ric and Public Reasoning: An Aristotelian Understanding of Political Deliberation’, Political Theory, 34:4 (2006), pp. 417–
438. A useful explication of Aristotle’s scheme can be found in Jon Hesk, ‘Types of Oratory’, in Erik Gunderson (ed) The
Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 145–161.
59Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 69–70.
60The contrary position is featured in James Martin, ‘Situating Speech: A Rhetorical Approach to Political Strategy’, Political
Studies, 63:1 (2015), pp. 25–42.
61Aristotle, op. cit., p. 76.
62E.g. Jeremy Engels, The Politics of Resentment: A Genealogy (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2015), p. 6.
63Cf. Victoria McVeer and Philip Pettit, ‘Sticky Judgment and the Role of Rhetoric’, in Richard Bourke and Raymond Geuss
(eds) Political Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 65–67. Note that Aristotle’s own account
does not extend the reach of rhetoric from inter- to intra-personal contexts of reference.
64Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 245–262.
65‘What do you think of the year’s funniest joke?’ Available at http://news.sky.com/story/what-do-you-think-of-the-years-
funniest-joke-10999344 (accessed 20 October 2017).
66E.g. see Andrew Murphy, ‘Longing, Nostalgia and Golden Age Politics: The American Jeremiad and the Power of the Past’,
Perspectives on Politics, 7:1 (2009), pp. 125–141.
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moralizing, conversational, anecdotal and vulgar. The OED stipulates that in modern use,
diatribe is a noun meaning ‘a dissertation or discourse directed against some person or
work; a bitter and violent criticism; or invective’.67 In political science, attention shown
to the diatribe as expressive form has been curiously minimal. The exception is Windt,
yet whose own eﬀort at retrieval is hampered by overplaying the connotation of shock-
value: he thinks that in politics, diatribe correlates with a ploy of using obscenity to
disrupt prevailing values – allegedly, a missing link between the ancient Cynics and
Vietnam war protest68 – but this is unwarranted, because obscenity cuts up against one
of the everyday connotations which is most useful to revive: that diatribes strike an acces-
sible tone. What may need clarifying, I add, is only that this accessibility to a broad audi-
ence does not preclude diatribes being open to quite intellectualized articulation. The
extended presence of typical features such humour and irony should not be mistaken
for lack of intelligent reﬂection. Indeed, perhaps there is one extra challenge for the
interpretation of reactionaries if practiced within a ‘scholarly’ setting: academia’s own rhe-
torical norms potentially make for seeing diatribes everywhere (understatement, the ten-
dency to qualiﬁcation, and so forth).
From everyday associations, we have several miscellaneous qualities for diatribe, plus
the notion of a discourse directed against someone or something. But, to get from
rough form to actual model, we must look to the ancients. The reﬁnement that the classical
sources oﬀer for this model of the diatribe is as follows. In the Greek, Roman and early
Christian worlds, the meaning of the diatribe was not wholly diﬀerent to our own.69
But there is special signiﬁcance in the Greek root term diatribein, which is worth recon-
necting with because it adds to the referents. The early meaning was of a ‘wearing away (of
time)’. From this, the classicist BarbaraWallach sums up the original idea of the diatribe in
a nutshell: ‘dwelling on the point’.70 To do so, Wallach in part identiﬁes Aristotle’s early
discussion, and it is worth taking that forward via some creative extrapolation. Aristotle
would appear to give diatribe two associations. The ﬁrst association is with the speaker
maximizing ‘opportunities for delay’,71 which extends the sense of point-dwelling. This
alone is important, because in rhetorical terms it pinpoints the repetition of a message
with the likely eﬀect of reinforcing it. Therefore, the reader of reactionary writings is
readied to be on the lookout for passages of text that enable conclusions about reactionary
‘style’: in the peeling away of repetition of phrase, question or sentence-part, is some
hidden meaning revealed? However, the second association of Aristotle may be more
telling. That is where we may speak of diatribe as a permutation of rhetorical ‘compo-
sition’. In other words, we are presented with an outline map for the internal structure
of the text. Conventionally, in classical rhetoric, a speech has four parts. The bona ﬁde
reactionary text, I suggest, is just the same. Accordingly, in (i) an exordium (or introduc-
tion), a reactionary showcases his personal credentials; in (ii) a narration, he states his case
in brief; in (iii) a proof, he demonstrates his case and tries to refute his adversary’s; and in
(iv) an epilogue (or ‘peroration’) he stirs – perhaps re-stirs – the audience to emotion to
67OED. ‘Diatribe, n.’. Available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/52133 (accessed 12 October 2017).
68Theodor Otto Windt Jr., ‘The Diatribe: Last Resort for Protest’, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58:1 (1972), pp. 1–14.
69Stanley K. Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981).
70Barbara Price Wallach, ‘Epimone and Diatribe: Dwelling on the Point in Ps.-Hermogenes’, Rheinische Museum für Philologie,
123:3/4 (1980), pp. 272–323.
71Aristotle, op. cit., 256.
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end upon.72 The most characteristic qualities of diatribe arise at the proof stage.73 In Aris-
totle’s second association, to diatribe is ‘to digress’.74 Furthermore, digression when you
are (should be) setting out your arguments will be peculiar within the genre of rhetoric
that belongs to politics (which is ‘deliberative’, or aimed at justifying future courses of
action): your subject is evident – and will have been introduced in the exordium; and
you ﬁnd that one of the few doors open to you is to digress by ‘attack’.75 Hence, on my
extrapolated deﬁnition, diatribe is – in particular – discourse which is punctuated by
regular digression and extended signiﬁcantly by recourse to blame.
Finally, should substantive qualitative analysis of reaction focus on the diatribe either in
the written or spoken word? It is for two main reasons I advocate attention to the written
and print format. First, there is some sense in rebalancing what is a more usual focus upon
the ‘talk’ discourses of the hard Right.76 The writings of reactionaries are an underused
resource, but they are myriad. Hence, the joke used as an epigraph above may be
funny, but is far from true. ‘Books’ have been produced not only by Trump (and
Hitler) but, to name but a few, by Sarah Palin, Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, Anders
Breivik, Joe McCarthy. Ghost-writing applies in some of these cases, but that is beside
the point: what matters the substance of communication, not the dynamics of production,
and in such books we ought to ﬁnd we are provided with rich, overlooked pointers regard-
ing, inter alia, how reactionary ideology is assembled, how it is validated, how it mutates.
Second, attention to the written text is the most reliable way of providing reaction with
historical contextualization. Necessarily, certain media were oﬀ limits at an earlier time
(say, talk radio), and so in order to control for the transmission mechanisms it is necessary
to pare the focus down. But note that ‘books’ encompass great variation. For instance,
some reactionary writings may comprise campaign texts, forcing any generalized political
reﬂection very sharply through the issues of the moment; others may aspire to the status of
being wide-ranging treatises. The variation is signiﬁcant only to the extent that the analyst
must be mindful not to impute any kind of hierarchy, and so potentially mistake what is
common to reaction in the process, by reading ‘higher’ and ‘lower’-end texts according to
diﬀerent procedures.
Illustrative cases
Summarizing, everyday use and classical instruction converge on three catchy soundbite
features of diatribe: digression, repetition, and point-dwelling. In advance of a conclusion,
I rehearse the method with four sample cases (covering politics from past to present). My
commentaries are only rough sketches, meant to be augmented by more patient analysis,
although they ought to showcase what (re)reading texts as diatribes would look like, and I
deliberately include the emerging evidence on behalf of ideological vacillation: that there
are numerous occasions in which reactionary stated belief runs into conservative stated
belief (and/ or back again). Each commentary begins with a reference to ‘rhetorical
72Richard Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 171–
174.
73E.M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric (London and Cambridge: MacMillan and Co., 1867), p. 359.
74Aristotle, op. cit., 256.
75Ibid.
76Ruth Wodak and John E. Richardson (eds) Analysing Fascist Discourse: European Fascism in Talk and Text (London: Rou-
tledge, 2013).
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situation’.77 That allows the idiosyncrasies of the texts to be assessed against the likely
expectations of particular audiences.
Reﬂections on the Revolution in France
Edmund Burke’s Reﬂections on the Revolution in France takes a pamphlet form, is pub-
lished in 1790 (at an early stage of the French Revolution) and, practically-speaking, for
a English readership. The remit of the book thereby seems implied by institutional
context, namely to challenge emerging revolutionary principles for an audience in
Britain. Reﬂections has a grand reputation: as a touchstone of modern conservative
thought, and as model of elegance in the English language (its numerous witticisms, for
example, are widely cited). Even conﬁned analysis disputes these notions.
Looking closely at an ‘exordium’ is the ﬁrst phase of our envisaged analysis. In Reﬂec-
tions, an opening has its most arresting facet in introducing a distinctive rhetorical device:
apostrophe. Apostrophe is a technique whereby speaker detaches himself from topic to
address a third party who duly becomes an imaginary character in the discourse them-
selves.78 Even more speciﬁcally, Burke allows his pamphlet to emulate the epistolatory
form (a letter), and the third party in question is Charles-Jean-François Dupont: a notional
‘gentleman in Paris’ towards whom he claims to be imparting solicited advice. This tech-
nique itself is an oddity – use of apostrophe is reckoned to be rare even within early
modern European discourse – 79 but additionally, what might make it tempting to assim-
ilate it to the diatribe is evidence that, assuming for the moment that the motive is tactical,
the implementation is sloppy. This is because the author fails to keep his address to the
third party consistent: by a ﬁfth page he has ‘begged leave’ to discuss potential fomenters
of revolution not in France, but in England, especially the case of the dissenting London
minister, Richard Price.80 Indeed, it emerges that unsmooth transitions like these are a
characteristic of Reﬂections overall – they have the eﬀect of bouncing the reader’s attention
around. Increasingly, there are signs that the third-party device is being persisted with
mainly to meet an impromptu need. Reﬂections employs no normal chapter divisions
(only weakly mitigated for by the epistolatory form). The side eﬀect is to multiply expo-
nentially how frequently the prose gets ahead of itself or wanders oﬀ point. And, at such
times, it is by writing sympathetic private asides to his ‘gentleman in Paris’ that he adapts
ad hocmeans for getting the prose back on track (making insertions like ‘ … . this, my dear
Sir, was not the triumph of France’).81
‘Narration’ in a rhetorical composition should supply an early compressed statement of
the case ahead but, in that case, in Reﬂections such a statement is delayed and takes the
passage of some thirty-ﬁve pages of throat-clearing to reach.82 Is the compressed case
equivalent to the case which Burke’s reputation prepares us for? That would consist in
77Lloyd Bitzer, ‘The Rhetorical Situation’ in John Lucaites, C.M. Condit and S. Caudill (eds.), Contemporary Rhetorical Theory
(London: Guildford Press, 1998), pp. 217–226.
78Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms (London: University of California Press, 1991), p. 20.
79Christopher Reid, ‘Burke as Rhetorician and Orator’ in David Dwan and Christopher J. Insole (eds), The Cambridge Com-
panion to Edmund Burke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 47.
80Edmund Burke, ‘Reﬂections on the Revolution in France’ in Iain Hampsher-Monk (ed) Revolutionary Writings (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 5.
81Ibid., p. 68. In rhetoric, the broken-script device is ‘aposioposis’: Robert Cockcroft and Susan Cockcroft, Persuading People:
An Introduction to Rhetoric (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 86.
82Ibid., pp. 36–41.
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an application to contemporary France – and, by extension, Britain – of the case against
radical political innovation, and in favour of tradition-guided reform (an argument that, in
1790 – pre-Jacobinism – is certainly open for Burke to make). Charitably, that case is
pursued piecemeal – in attenuated reference to the repair of France’s ‘ancient’ constitution
– but what appears curious is the weight does not rest on recommendation and advice, but
instead falls upon blame. Even a minor seeming detail like grammatical tense evinces this:
‘You might, if you pleased, have proﬁted of our example, and have given to your recovered
freedom a correspondent dignity’.83 As a grammatical construction, this sentence is an
abnormality, since it is past-tense-conditional and requires mental time-travel on the
part of the reader to grasp (i.e. a completed action is the subject of the sentence, but it
is an action which never really took place).
Because, in diatribe, proof will be extended by digression, that the main body of Reﬂec-
tions should oﬀer abundant material of interest is predictable. Pointers thus emerge for
how expanded analysis might examine the slippage between conservative and reactionary
modes. The reputed Burke, of course, is ‘conservative’, and articulates the tangible
markers of that ideology (defends social organicism premised in natural hierarchy, is
sceptical towards grand schemes founded upon abstraction). Three rough phases of argu-
mentation within the main body expose the vacillation alike. First, in accord with appar-
ent intentions, Burke enumerates emerging revolutionary principles, but there is slippage
between modes because incongruous denunciation of the high-bred features alongside
the expectable defamation of the lowly ‘Third Estate’: self-abasing French noblemen
are ‘turbulent, discontented men of quality’ who betray ‘their own’ by joining the revolu-
tionary ranks. Lest we rush to re-code this as ‘populism’, notice how much bagginess
there is in the ally Burke reaches out to: sometimes ‘the people of England’, but also
those who are ‘generous enemies’, ‘for God’, ‘look up with awe to Kings’, or possess
‘real hearts of ﬂesh and blood’.84 Second, Burke contrasts Enlightenment and pre-
Enlightenment eras, building up to a crescendo in the ﬂorid ode to Marie-Antoinette.
That is very easily reinterpreted as digression because Burke mock-apologises for such
on the page: ‘Excuse me, therefore, if I have dwelt too long on this atrocious spectacle’.85
Third, an exegesis of the proper bases of the social order (religion and the ‘spirit of gen-
tlemen’) does pass through a rendition of the famed critique of abstraction (ideas are
meaningless without practical contexts of reference), but meanwhile appears dragged
along, almost unintentionally, to a vaguer but stronger thesis: the evil of abstractions
is to eﬀect a tabula rasa in politics from which atheists can run amok and liberate all
kinds of human wrongdoing.
A recognizable ‘epilogue’ concludes Reﬂections and, certainly, compared to the fore-
going, is a paragon of succinctness (conﬁned to three pages). Yet something else is strik-
ing. Perhaps, after exhausting bouts of frenzied attack, tone and message are
unsurprisingly weary, falling somewhere between resignation and forgiveness: ‘ … let
us be satisﬁed to admire rather than attempt to follow in their desperate ﬂights the aero-
nauts of France’.86
83Ibid., p. 36.
84Ibid., pp. 68, 98, 89.
85Ibid., p. 82.
86Ibid., p. 249.
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Considerations on France
The rhetorical situation of Joseph de Maistre’s Considerations on France is partly similar,
but moves from England to France (excepting that Maistre writes as a subject of the
House of Savoy and that, in due course, the Directory was to forbid the sale of the
book inside French borders). The text is concerned with the same historical events,
but Considerations is not published until 1797 and, importantly, therefore speaks to an
audience for whom the full extent of the revolutionary Terror – the guillotine – is
known. A more particular objective discernible is to de-legitimise recent experiences
within a theological view of the world. More prosaically, it appears Maistre plans to
accomplish what he wants to achieve within a compacter space (Considerations is a
shorter work than Reﬂections, half the length at 120 pages). Political philosophers have
seldom taken Maistre’s ideas seriously, and historians of ideas most of all have been
struck by the emphasis on slaughter, yet it should not be assumed that deﬂating Con-
siderations is uncontroversial, since there are defenders of Maistre, still, who maintain
that he wrote angelically.87
The exordium of Considerations is ﬁerce and sets up the book’s strongly moralizing reg-
ister. The striking opening sentence inverts the sentiments of the parallel opening sentence
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract (which more literate contemporaries would
have recognized as the revolutionaries’ how-to manual): ‘We are all attached to the
throne of Supreme Being by a supple chain that restrains us without enslaving us’. The
identiﬁcation of an adversary is a conventional opening gambit of rhetorical compositions,
but far more unusual is that the audience is admonished: ‘in the works of man, everything
is as wretched as their author’.88 Grasped in reference to the doctrine of original sin, Mais-
tre’s strictures about the dangers of human pride do echo the Christian theology in exhibit.
Yet, they could also oﬀer food for thought about the general ambivalence with which reac-
tionaries may avert to attack and blame.
Over four pages at the end of chapter one, Considerations performs narration. Maistre
previews the case that revolutionary violence is divine punishment for mankind’s dethron-
ing God for human rationality. Self-understanding by standing on the wrong side of
History is communicated early and explicitly: ‘we are spoiled by a modern philosophy
that tells us all is good, whereas evil has tainted everything’.89 That is joined by a metaphor
that serves as a solace to fellow reactionaries, an eﬀective message within a message: a
‘black magic’ is at work in God’s hidden orchestration of revolutionary events, such
that ‘we may admire order in disorder’, self-aware that a purer France will emerge on
the other side of all the violence.90
Point-dwelling is a manifest feature of proof in Considerations. That is perhaps no more
evident than in regard to the death of King Louis XVI. Maistre lets his writing linger here –
returning to the king’s death three times – and the bloodiness of the act is underlined. On
one occasion, the act is explicitly juxtaposed with the gruesome execution of the late eight-
eenth-century regicide, Damiens, as made notorious by Michel Foucault. 91 Another time
87See King, Antimodern Condition, op. cit., esp. pp. 16–20.
88Joseph de Maistre, Considerations on France, edited by Richard A. Lebrun (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
p. 3.
89Ibid., p. 31.
90Ibid., p. 14; italics added.
91Ibid., p. 30.
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he solicits his readers to join him in venting against those more politick kind of Frenchmen
who, by the late 1790s, have reconciled themselves to the Revolution, though not out of
conscience, rather self-serving prudence. Intriguingly, this appears in the guise of black
humour, an acid impersonation: ‘Very well, it was perhaps unnecessary to execute the
king; but since the deed is done, do not mention it again and let us all be good friends.
Madness!’.92 And yet, the main body of Considerations is not all ﬁre and brimstone.
Perhaps there exists a connection between those aspects of literary quality his defenders
play up and his movement into the more moderate positions. Considerations is actually
neatly arranged into eleven equivalent length chapters, such that the ﬁerce declamatory
style is belied by some conscientious internal organization. Between chapters two to
eight appear two apparent segments of positive demonstration followed by a sequence
of ‘refutations’ (of republican political theory, of Enlightenment philosophy, and of
various schemes for constitution-making). In particular, the refutation of republican pol-
itical theory yields moments where reaction cedes to the conservative motif of pragmatism
– embodied in Maistre’s rejoinder that if popular sovereignty is to prevail then institutions
for expressing it must not be geographically located solely in Paris, and also in his analogy
that building a democratic republic is like dice-rolling, since there is a small chance it will
succeed but a bigger chance it will not.93
The epilogue of Considerations is a missed chance for the author to wrap up his
message in a pleasing and concise ending. After the sequence of refutations, active delib-
eration about a future course of action seems to the fore in the selection of the topic of the
‘counter-revolution’: how it may pass, how fears about it might be allayed. But these chap-
ters nine and ten are supplemented by redundant loquaciousness in an additional chapter
eleven, which very surely counts as digression, and in fact could hardly be stranger, since it
comprises verbatim passages from the Scottish philosopher, David Hume, concerning
events in seventeenth-century England, but repackaged as if they were a comment on
France’s present.
America by Heart
Sarah Palin’s America by Heart is a 288-page book published in 2010 and a follow-up to
her memoir-styled Going Rogue published the year before.94 The institutional context can
be surmised exactly. The author is the serving state governor for Alaska on the cusp of
stepping from oﬃce: two years after her failed run for the vice-presidency she is in
search of a new role, but a role that (at the time) looks likely to involve some relationship
with the rising Tea Party movement. America by Heart does not emulate the conspicu-
ously general kind of reﬂection aimed at by either Burke or Maistre, and the genre
known in American politics as the senator’s book discloses the standards for judgment.
Even the sympathetic reader with prior knowledge of Palin will be primed for a bad
book: she writes in the wake of a disastrous showing in the televised election debates of
2008.95 But, in fact, despite some presentational quirks – such as a large typeset – the
92Ibid., p. 12.
93Ibid., pp. 32, 36.
94Sarah Palin, America by Heart: Reﬂections on Family, Faith and Flag (New York: Broadside Books, 2013); Palin, Going Rogue:
An American Life (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2009).
95Mitchell S. McKinney, Leslie A. Rill and Rebekah G. Watson, ‘Who Framed Sarah Palin? Viewer Reactions to the 2008 Vice
Presidential Debate’, American Behavioural Scientist 55:3 (2011), pp. 212–231.
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formal organization of America by Heart adheres to the classical rhetorical arrangement
quite faithfully.
America by Heart begins with a strong exordium: ‘An American Awakening’. This is
heavy on what scholars of rhetoric call actualization.96 Palin recounts her speaking
tours across the country – in particular, the people she has met – and, in the process, con-
structs a vivid frame through which the reader will be led to ﬁlter all forthcoming mess-
ages. Although, in rhetoric, it can be standard to use all aﬀective means to showcase
personality, the extent to which this author relies on emotion and not rationality to do
her persuading for her is acutely apparent. That grows into the schmaltziness of her
prose, hence the bridge from the front matter to main body: ‘This is my America, from
my heart, and by my heart. I give it now to my children and grandchildren, and to
yours, so that they will always know what it was like in American when people were
free’.97 Actualization combined with schmaltz means that what could be plausible ‘popu-
lism’ tropes are regularly deployed: ‘the little guy’, ‘normal Americans’, ‘patriotic indigna-
tion’.98 Although, under closer scrutiny, it transpires these meanings will not be
automatically transparent to the analyst.
Narration seems enclosed within chapter one and centres on the United States Consti-
tution. It is headed ‘We the People’ but, in referencing the Declaration of Independence,
ought to be coded not to populism, but to libertarian and biblical categories. This
chapter clariﬁes the intended remit of the book: to demonstrate the decline of the
‘nation’ in all ﬁelds that has accelerated since 2008 (that is, since Republican defeat to
Obama and Biden). Overall, where discussion in America by Heart pushes to the greatest
level of generality is when Palin is evoking the nation’s founding to promulgate themes
associated with American exceptionalism. Palin emits an avowed commitment to ‘conser-
vatism’ (the sub-heading for her conclusion is ‘Commonsense Constitutional Conserva-
tism’), but it could be observed that while promulgating American exceptionalism she
often tramples on conservative shibboleths, because she invokes – not decries – grand
abstractions: particularly ‘freedom’. She makes this predilection for abstraction roughly
compatible with schmaltz: ‘if you love freedom, thank a vet’. Nevertheless, ambiguity
about the reaction/ conservatism boundary is implied in the selection of ﬁelds of national
life for focused discussion. These are largely normal and mainstream to American conser-
vatism, and what is special is only the focus on family and strong women. The other topics
are the military; the nation; self-reliance; religion in the private sphere; and religion in the
public sphere. Intermittently, Palin gestures to standing on the wrong side of History,
when she returns to ‘big government’, making that into the antithesis of the Constitution
– ‘our true north’ – and, more often than not, trying to document why its encroachment is
not only undesirable and imprudent, but potentially fatal, for America.99
The eight chapters of the main body survey American life by the ﬁelds identiﬁed and
one of the overwhelming senses the reader picks up is of heavy repetition. Observed
closely, the organization of the material carries some repetition in itself. Each main
chapter tweaks a multi-purpose argument, executed in the exact same series of steps: anec-
dotal evidence from Palin’s own life; the lapse from standards of excellence in a given ﬁeld
96Cockcroft and Cockcroft, op. cit., pp. 61–66.
97America by Heart, p. xii; italics added.
98Ibid., pp. xiii, x.
99Ibid., p. xiv.
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of national life; the celebration of a particular national ﬁgure said to have been the last in
whom excellence was embodied. Repetition is equally manifest at the precise level of argu-
mentation. America by Heart has an anthology feel to it because, in seeking to corroborate
decline, the author quotes – and quotes persistently. The material quoted from richly
varies from the low-brow (putatively ‘populist’?) – such as ﬁlms with a right-wing
message – to the rareﬁed (unlikely philosophical inspirations, such as Plato and Tocque-
ville). Equally interesting, the quotations are meandering. Each is allowed to drag on
several sentences longer than a more assured writer would allow, some exceeding two
pages, and the eﬀect on the reader seems more distracting than reinforcing, giving the
impression of an author losing control of her discourse.
After the lapse of proof into mercurial repetition, the epilogue is, however, tidy. Because
the Constitution is the explicit topic revisited, it completes the book in an aesthetically
satisfying arc. The reader is taken back to where he or she started from.
Crippled America
Donald Trump’s Crippled America was published in 2015 – preﬁguring his shock presi-
dential election victory in November 2016 – and, like the Palin text, is preceded by an
author’s better-known autobiography, The Art of the Deal.100 In this case the sample
text is also preceded by a previous election-time book, Time to Get Tough, dating back
to an aborted Trump campaign for the presidency in 2012.101 Crippled America is a rela-
tively short book: only 176 pages. By genre, the text emulates the recognized model of the
policy primer, albeit doubling-up as a campaign text. The subtitle echoes the campaign
slogan: ‘How to Make America Great Again’.
An exordium (here labelled a ‘preface’) is bare at just six fast-paced pages, but is simple
enough to grasp: ‘You Gotta Believe’. Already it exhibits the strong preference for the one-
sentence paragraph. The reactionary self-understanding by reference to History is evident:
‘ …we are not in a joyous situation right now. We’re in a situation where we have to go
back to work to make America great again’.102 By comparison with the Palin text, con-
scious anger is transmitted with even sparser reﬁnement, since the prose is allowed to
spill out on the page in great haste:
Some readers may be wondering why the picture we used on the cover of this book is so angry
and mean looking. I had some beautiful pictures taken in which I had a big smile on my face
… But I decided [that] wasn’t appropriate… .103
A narration could be seen as corresponding to the ﬁrst chapter of seventeen: ‘Winning
Again’. The case summarized is simple: ‘we need a government that is committed to
winning and has experience in winning’.104 Within closer analysis, what could be interest-
ing to pursue is that the early part of Crippled America almost completing ignores the con-
ventional rhetorical advice to set a tone by abjuring boastfulness for humility: ‘I have
proven everybody wrong. EVERYBODY!’.105
100Donald J. Trump, Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again (New York, NY: Threshold, 2015); Trump with Tony
Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal (London: Arrow Books, 2016 [orig. 1987]).
101Trump, Time to Get Tough: Make America Great Again (Washington, DC: Regency, 2012).
102Trump, Crippled America, p. ix.
103Ibid., p. ix.
104Ibid., p. 3.
105Ibid., p. 5.
20 R. SHORTEN
Participation in the policy primer genre is identiﬁable in the allocation of main body
chapters to discrete policy areas. This creates expectations of what the book ought to be
doing: namely, outlining a ‘policy platform’ so that plans cohere, so that practical initiat-
ives can be sketched. However, even on a generous estimate, those expectations are con-
founded entirely. Within the chapters, achieving digression is quite a feat, since prima facie
there is little available space to do so: no chapter is more than twelve pages maximum.
Haste continues to be on show again in impatience to get to the end of reasoning
chains, to follow up whatever loose policy proposal has been described with an inﬂection
on the ubiquitous tagline (‘our healthcare will be well again’, ‘we can make America beau-
tiful again’). There is also a default course for chapters to divert quickly into attack (unless
veering oﬀ instead into bombastic self-praise): the education chapter, for instance, turns to
blaming ‘the teacher unions’ after just ﬁve pages. Outside the individual chapters, digres-
sion manifests in whole extended phases, often lasting over several chapters at a time.
Chapter nine – ‘Nice Guys Can Finish First’ – is a short diversion, which departs from
the description of policy ambitions to take issue with the alleged myth that Trump is
not a bona ﬁde Republican (which itself creates a contradiction with the delight taken else-
where in book in perceived ostracism from ‘establishment’ conservatism).106 The most
extended digression occurs in the series of chapters from thirteen to ﬁfteen (‘Values’, ‘A
New Game in Town’, ‘Treating the Media Dollars and Sense’), which scan as thin-
skinned responses to perceived slights by ‘my critics’,107 or the unprompted pursuit of
grudges. The line that Trump walks between reaction and conservatism tends to feature
mostly when the book is laying archetypically conservative emphasis on either evidence
or basic economics. As such, possible exceptions to weak demonstration are the two chap-
ters on the construction industry and tax reform, where in both cases some amount of
ﬁscal reasoning is oﬀered.
At surface level, an epilogue is shrewd, because by sub-heading the campaign slogan is
re-worked for a ﬁnal time, performing recapitulation in the process: ‘Making America
Great Again’. That a personal anecdote is to the fore in closing is also suitable. Trump
compacts a tale of his very ﬁrst construction project, which is meanwhile a rhetorical
synecdoche, because the ‘dying building’ Trump he took on in 1974 represents America
circa 2016. But within the anecdote, the self-congratulation – to the point of hubris – is
incongruous. And, as in Maistre’s Considerations, crisp ending runs the risk of being
squandered. The ending of Crippled America included superﬂuous appendix material
once more. Seventeen smaller-print pages, under the title ‘About the Author’, assiduously
detail past business accomplishments.
Conclusion
My words in conclusion are mainly devoted to consolidating the new research direction
proposed. As such, I re-iterate that the category of political reaction is generally under-
played, but that given the challenge posed by contemporary realities to both scholarship
and the quality of civic life, there would seem good grounds for putting it to greater
work. Populism is not an awful category – and reaction is not a failsafe one – but, in
106Ibid., pp. 98, 99.
107Ibid., p. xi.
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the least, some of the problems experienced by populism theories oﬀer lessons for reviving
the theory of reaction in a convincing way. My argument for re-envisioning reaction as a
second-order ideology is premised on the recurrence of the reactionary admission to
standing upon the ‘wrong side of History’. This admission sounds surprising, but is not
illusory, nor reducible to ironic appropriation in the face of ‘progressivist’ taunts. For
why would reactionaries tell other reactionaries that they stand on the History’s wrong
side? The main emphasis of the present contribution has been methodological. The prac-
tical groundwork for an ideological theory of reaction has been laid out in a further prop-
osition concerning an archetypical reactionary communication form: the diatribe. In a
two-step process, a model of the diatribe might help investigators to determine exactly
which texts to invest time reading closely and, moreover, how to do so. A rapid application
of this method already yields a tentative ﬁnding. This is that some texts published in the
names of Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Sarah Palin and Donald Trump elicit recur-
rent criss-crossing between positions that are prima facie reactionary and conservative.
Are predictions feasible? Tempting fate is rarely wise, but in the context of Western con-
servative parties that appear to be undergoing rightward shifts, this prospect could actually
be quite sanguine. For while a phenomenon of ideological adjustment is quite familiar in
ideology studies – and implies movement in a single direction only – there may also be a
phenomenon of ideological vacillation worth appreciating, with special application to the
ideological Right, and whereby changes are both transient and occur in multiple
directions.
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